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Time and again, we have seen that neither precedent nor a perceived need
to achieve consensus on the Court can hold Justice Clarence Thomas back from
pronouncing what he has found to be the best understanding of the Constitu-
tion and federal statutes. His decisions scrape away at what Ralph Rossum has
called the "excrescence" of flawed precedent,' no matter how deeply en-
trenched. He looks beyond the entrenchment to the Constitution and history.
Not surprisingly, his administrative law decisions and his decisions directly in-
terpreting the Constitution receive the most attention. But the Justice's deep
commitment to not only thinking, but rethinking is also on display in the more
prosaic criminal-law opinions I will discuss.
In Justice Thomas's first term, the Court considered Evans v. United States, 2
in which it was called on to interpret the Hobbs Act's prohibition on extortion
"under color of official right."' Writing for the six-person majority in Evans,
Justice Stevens determined that when Congress adopted the Hobbs Act in
1946, it believed it was codifying the common-law crime of extortion, as New
York recently had done.4 And at common law, Stevens said, extortion required
1. RALPH A. RossuM, UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RESTORATION 12 (2014).
2. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
3. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). Section (a) of the Hobbs Acts prohibits interference
with interstate commerce through, inter alia, "extortion." Section (b)(2) defines extortion as
"the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actu-
al or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
4. 504 U.S. at 264.
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only that a public official accept a payment made in return for official acts;
there was no requirement that the official initiate or induce the payment, which
was the issue that had split the circuit courts.' Therefore, said Justice Stevens,
mere acceptance of money or property, knowing it was intended to be a bribe,
constitutes Hobbs Act extortion.6
Justice Thomas's dissent was powerful and persuasive. The majority, he
said, got the common law wrong, and hence got the Hobbs Act wrong.' The
Justice took on not just the issue that had split the circuit courts-whether the
public official had to have induced the bribe, or whether just taking a bribe is
enough for conviction. Neither taking nor inducing was enough, Justice
Thomas said, because the Hobbs Act did not prohibit bribery.' It criminalized a
different wrong: extortion. Citing nineteenth-century and early twentieth-
century cases, he showed that the common-law offense of official extortion re-
quired not only that the official obtained a payment, but also that he obtained
the payment under a "false pretense of official right to the payment."' Neither
receiving a bribe nor inducing a bribe was enough. The official had to dupe the
payor into thinking that the official was due the payment. Indeed, the very
words of the Hobbs Act say that: the statute defines official extortion as "the
obtaining of property from another ... under color of official right."o
The difference between Justice Thomas's interpretation and that of the ma-
jority is not merely of linguistic, historical, or academic interest. Justice Thom-
as showed that the Court's interpretation effectively eliminated the longstand-
ing distinction between bribery and extortion. But this distinction is im-
important. Bribery is a crime committed by both the bribe payor and the bribe
receiver; when a bribe is paid, both the payor and the recipient may be prose-
cuted. Extortion, on the other hand, is a crime in which the payor is the victim
of the official, not his accomplice or confederate." Perhaps most importantly
(though not noted by Thomas, likely because the point was not critical to his
analysis): extortion under color of official right is surely the more heinous
5. Id. at 264-65.
6. Id. at 265-66.
7. Id. at 278 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 283. Justice Thomas went on to conclude: "The Court, therefore, errs in asserting that
common-law extortion is the 'rough equivalent of what we would now describe as 'taking a
bribe."' Id. (quoting id. at 260 (majority opinion)).
9. Id. at 282; see id. at 281-84, 284 1-4.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 19 5 1(b)(2) (2012).
ii. Evans, 504 U.S. at 283-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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crime, for it instantiates both corruption and coercion.12 Indeed, the maximum
sentence for conviction of Hobbs Act extortion has always been twenty years in
prison, whereas the four principal federal bribery statutes at the time the
Hobbs Act was enacted had a maximum penalty of three years in prison (plus
disqualification from holding office).1" Justice Thomas noted that the majori-
ty's interpretation gave license to federal prosecutors to prosecute state and lo-
cal officials (and those who pay them off) for bribery, under the guise of prose-
cuting them for extortion."
Let me add a footnote. Beginning with its first bribery law in 1789, Con-
gress had clearly and consistently limited federal criminalization of bribery only
to the bribing of federal officials." There is nothing in the legislative history of
12. Moreover, the Hobbs Act prohibits both extortion and an even more serious form of coerced
procurement of money: robbery. The operative language of the Hobbs Act has not changed
since it was non-substantively revised in 1948; 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) provides in full:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or con-
spires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be
fined ... or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
13. Compare Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 420(e) (1946) (non-substantively revised and codified in
1948 at 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Supp. 1947-1949)), with id. § 91 ("Bribery of United States
officer"), id. § 207 ("Official accepting bribe"), id. § 199 ("Accepting bribe by Member of
Congress"), and id. § 200 ("Offering bribe to Member of Congress"). When these and other
federal bribery laws were consolidated in 1962 into a new provision, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp.
1959-1963), the maximum prison sentence was increased to (and remains) fifteen years in
prison (plus disqualification from holding office).
14. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court chooses ... the interpreta-
tion that maximizes federal criminal jurisdiction over state and local officials."). Thomas
noted that a single sentence of a 1972 decision from the Third Circuit, United States v. Kenny,
462 F.2d 1205, 1229, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972), had introduced the conflation of Hobbs
Act extortion by official right, on the one hand, and the crime of bribery, on the other. See
Evans, 504 U.S. at 290-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that "Kenny obliterated the
distinction between extortion and bribery, essentially creating a new crime encompassing
both"). As Judge Noonan, cited by Justice Thomas, id. at 291, explained in his encyclopedic
and meticulous examination of the history of bribery law:
As effectively as if there were federal common law crimes, the court in Ken-
ny ... amend [ed] the Hobbs Act and br [ought] into existence a new crime - local
bribery affecting interstate commerce. Hereafter, for purposes of Hobbs Act pros-
ecutions, such bribery was to be called extortion. The federal policing of state cor-
ruption had begun.
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A MORAL IDEA 586 (1984).
15. The first federal law to address bribery provided for only civil penalties. See Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 29, 46-47 (providing that bribery of customs officers would result in
disqualification from office with both parties subject to being fined). The bribery provision
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the Hobbs Act that suggests that in 1946 (or in 1934, when Congress first pro-
hibited affecting interstate commerce by extortion under color of official right)
Congress thought it was making all state and local bribery a federal crime. 16
The words of the Hobbs Act prohibition were far more limited, setting federal
prosecutors loose only on those non-federal officials who obtained payment
under the pretense of official right.
Justice Thomas's early, virtually ignored, dissent in Evans was prescient.
Twenty-four years later, in Ocasio v. United States," the majority opinion by
former United States Attorney Samuel Alito followed Evans' logic to hold that
indeed the victim of an extortion under color of official right -the citizen pay-
ing the official -could be prosecuted as a co-conspirator of the official who
takes the payment." To be clear, as strange as it sounds, Ocasio held that a
Hobbs Act "victim" can "conspire" in his own extortion. 9
of the Crimes Act of 1790 prohibited federal judges from receiving bribes, and provided, in
addition to disqualification, for a fine and imprisonment "at the discretion of the court."
Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 112, 117. The offense of "extortion ... under, or by col-
our of his office," applicable only to federal officials, was added in the Crimes Act of 1825, ch.
65, § 12, 4 Stat. 115, 118. The principal statute prohibiting bribery of federal officials is now
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012), which was enacted in its current form in 1962. See Act of Oct. 23,
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-849, § i(a), 76 Stat. 1119-20 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 201);
see also supra note 13. Also in the early 196os, Congress enacted the Travel Act of 1961, Pub.
L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012)), which includes
state bribery law as a predicate offense. It was not until 1984 that the Federal Program Brib-
ery statute, Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 1104, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012)), came into force. The latter explicitly reaches instances of bribery
by any agent of a recipient of federal funds; the statute is targeted at, inter alia, state and lo-
cal corruption. But federal prosecutors know that "extortion" has connotations of coercion,
and even violence, that are not present in the term "bribery." It is thus not surprising that
state and local bribery schemes are often charged not under the federal program bribery
statute but as Hobbs Act extortion. See, e.g., United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp. 3d 33
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (denying motion for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict of guilty as to,
inter alia, two Hobbs Act counts of extortion under color of official right), vacated on other
grounds, No. 16-1615 -CR, 2017 WI 2978386 (2d Cir. July 13, 2017).
16. The relevant provisions of the 1946 Hobbs Act "did not make any significant change in the
section referring to obtaining property 'under color of official right' that had been prohibit-
ed by the 1934 [Anti-Racketeering] Act." Evans, 504 U.S. at 262. Justice Stevens later re-
marked that the legislative history of the Hobbs Act was "sparse and unilluminating with re-
spect to the offense of extortion." Id. at 264.
17. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016).
18. Id. at 1436. The defendant, a local police officer, was prosecuted for violating the Hobbs Act
and for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, after he accepted
payments from automobile body shops in return for referring accident victims to the shops.
He challenged his conspiracy conviction, "contending that, as a matter of law, he c [ould ]not
be convicted of conspiring with the [bribe payors] to obtain money from them under color
of official right." Id at 1427. The Court rejected this contention, relying on Evans. Id. at 1434
("The subtext of [Ocasio's] arguments is that it seems unnatural to prosecute bribery on the
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In his Ocasio dissent, Justice Thomas reprised his Evans dissent. History, he
explained again, was on the side of the defendant, because extortion and brib-
ery are different crimes.20 Interestingly, Justice Breyer, who had not been on the
Court when Evans was decided, filed a concurring opinion in Ocasio, forth-
rightly admitting that he "agree [d] with the sentiment expressed" in Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion that Evans "may well have been wrongly decid-
basis of a statute prohibiting 'extortion,' but this Court held in Evans that Hobbs Act extor-
tion 'under color of official right' includes the 'rough equivalent of what we would now de-
scribe as "taking a bribe""' (citing and quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 260)). Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a separate
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, that relied on the Hobbs Act's
language prohibiting obtaining property "from another." Id. at 1440 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Breyer's concurring opinion is discussed infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
ig. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1436. The decision noted that it did not reach the question whether a
"color of right" extortion victim (the bribe payor) may be prosecuted as an accomplice to a
Hobbs Act violation committed by the person engaged in extortion (the bribe recipient),
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012). Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432 n.6. But the decision went on
to note that the Government's brief had cited cases for the proposition that the bribe payor
"may be guilty of [color of official right] Hobbs Act extortion as an aider and abettor." Id.
The federal mens rea standard for accomplice liability is close to, if not equivalent to, the
"specific intent" required for conspiracy liability. See id. at 1430. As reported in DANIEL C.
RICHMAN, KATE STITH, &WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 469-70 (2014), all
federal Courts of Appeals have adopted some version of "Learned Hand's classic language in
United States v. Peoni, loo F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938),. .. [explaining that] 'the govern-
ment must prove that the defendant . . . "participate [d] in [the criminal venture] as in
something he wishe[d] to bring about, and [sought] by his actions to make it succeed.""' It
is hard to find daylight between this high standard of mens rea required for accomplice lia-
bility and the mens rea required for conspiratorial liability. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432, 1435, re-
iterates the conspiracy standard enunciated in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64
(1997): conspirators must "share a common purpose" and pursue "the same criminal objec-
tive." Hence, at least as matters now stand, Ocasio foretells the Court also holding that bribe
payors can be found guilty of the substantive crime of Hobbs Act extortion. Again, as
strange as it sounds, this would mean the extortion victim is guilty of his own extortion.
More portentously, the decision may foretell reconsideration of what constitutes a criminal
conspiracy, at least as regards the Hobbs Act, see infra text accompanying notes 23-29. There
may also be, waiting in the wings, reconsideration of whether foreign officials may be prose-
cuted for conspiracy to receive bribes the giving of which was in contravention of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 7 8dd-1 to 7 8dd-3, 7 8ff (2012). See Michael F.
Dearington, Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court's Sudden Expansion of Conspiracy
Liability (and Why Bribe-Taking Foreign Officials Should Take Note) (Feb. 27, 2017) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author); Shu-en Wee & Daniel Richman, Bribery Con-
spiracies, Foreign and Domestic: Ocasio v. United States and Its Implications for FCPA Complici-
ty Theories, COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Aug. 15, 2016), http://wp.nyu.edu/compliance
enforcement/2o16/oS/15/bribery-conspiracies-foreign-and-domestic-ocasio-v-united
-states-and-its-implications-for-fcpa-complicity-theories [http://perma.cc/NES5-AS2B].
20. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
237
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
ed."2 1 But Justice Breyer said that he felt constrained to "take Evans as good
law."22 Justice Thomas, of course, would not and does not let an erroneous pri-
or construction of a federal statute stand in the way of getting it right twenty-
four years later.
Ocasio's majority opinion raises a host of troubling issues. The decision not
only continues the Evans conceit that color-of-right extortion is merely bribery,
but also suggests the expansion of federal prosecutorial authority to charge
commercial-extortion victims in the private sector with conspiracy to violate
the Hobbs Act.23 Perhaps most importantly, Ocasio may have thrown a monkey
wrench into the settled understanding of what constitutes an "agreement" in
federal conspiracy law. The opinion denies that its holding will mean that every
color-of-right-extortion bribe payor is also a conspirator in her own extor-
tion.24 But it is in this discussion that the majority unsettles our longstanding
understanding that conspiracy agreements may be entered into unenthusiasti-
cally.25 The majority distinguishes between a conspiratorial agreement, on one
hand, and the "minimal 'consent"' required to trigger liability under the Hobbs
Act, on the other hand.2 6 As an example, the majority says that "mere acquies-
21. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer went on to note that "[t]he present case underscores
some of the problems that Evans raises." Id.
22. Id. Ocasio had not sought to have Evans overruled, and counsel conceded at oral argument
that he took the holding in Evans "as a given." Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at
20, Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (No. 14-361)). "That being so," said Breyer, "I join the majority's
opinion in full." Id.
23. In addition to extortion "under color of official right," the Hobbs Act prohibits extortion
"induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear." Hobbs Act, is
U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). See also supra note 3. These provisions apply to private-sector, as well
as public-sector, extortion. See, e.g., United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 954 (2d Cit. 1987) (en
banc) (holding that threats of economic harm are extortionate when "the defendant pur-
ports to have the power to hurt the victim in economic terms and fear is induced:") (quoting
United States v. Brecht, 54o F.2d 45, 51 n.11 (2d Cit. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977))).
The Ocasio Court did not limit its holding to conspiracy to violate the "color of right" prong
of the Hobbs Act. Indeed, Justice Alito seemingly went out of his way to suggest that volun-
tary payments made by "a store owner ... to gang members" to ensure they would not
"trash the store" could -assuming the evidence showed that the store owner voluntarily en-
tered into this cost-of-doing-business arrangement with the gang members - be guilty of
conspiracy to extort herself. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1435.
24. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1435.
25. See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1164
(1973) ("[T]he term 'agreement' may connote anything from firm commitment to engage in
criminal activity oneself to reluctant approval of a criminal plot to be carried out entirely by
others.").
26. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1435; see also id. at 1432 ("[W]hen [a] person's consent or acquiescence is
inherent in the underlying substantive offense, something more than bare consent or acqui-
escence may be needed to prove that the person was a conspirator.").
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cence" in a demand for payment by a local health inspector, whereby a restau-
rant owner agrees to pay "reluctantly," does not constitute a conspiracy.27
Really? Many conspiratorial agreements may be entered into "reluctantly"
or with "mere acquiescence." For instance, a smitten lover who only "reluctant-
ly" agrees to murder his paramour's spouse is nonetheless guilty of conspiracy
to commit murder. Likewise, a person who only reluctantly agrees to provide
opioids to his friend's addicted sister because she is undergoing withdrawal
symptoms is nonetheless guilty of conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Justice
Breyer, in his concurrence, recognizes the problem wrought by Justice Alito's
attempt to distinguish reluctant consent from reluctant conspiratorial agree-
ments. As to the restaurant-payor scenario, Justice Breyer notes "the difficult
distinction between the somewhat involuntary behavior of the bribe payor and
the voluntary behavior of the same bribe payor .. ."28 Likewise, former New
York prosecutor and U.S. District Judge Sonia Sotomayor asks in her dissent,
with apparent consternation:
When does mere "consent" tip over into conspiracy? Does it depend on
whose idea it was? Whether the bribe was floated as an "official de-
mand" or a suggestion? How happy the citizen is to pay off the public
official? How much money is involved? Whether the citizen gained a
benefit (a liquor license) or avoided a loss (closing the restaurant)?
How many times the citizen paid the bribes? Whether he ever resisted
paying or called the police?29
The bottom line: Evans was wrong. Rather than try to follow its logic, and
thereby fouling adjacent areas of criminal-law doctrine, the Court should have,
as Justice Thomas argued, cut out the tumor.
Two other Thomas criminal-law opinions likewise make a good pair and
reveal Justice Thomas's disposition to rethink first principles. In City of Chicago
v. Morales,o decided in 1999, the plurality held that Chicago's new antiloitering
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and therefore deprived persons of lib-
erty without due process of law. Justice Thomas's dissent said the notion of a
constitutional right to loiter "withers when exposed to the relevant history.""
He showed that loitering laws have existed at least since the Norman Conquest
and were commonplace both at the Founding and when the Fourteenth
27. Id. at 1436.
28. Id. at 1437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
29. 136 S. Ct. at 1445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
30. 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 103 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Amendment was ratified.32 But the creation of a new constitutional right was
not his only concern. He also criticized the holding that the ordinance was un-
constitutionally vague. Quoting from Justice White's dissent in Kolender v.
Lawson, Justice Thomas said, "any fool would know" what conduct was
reached by the statute."
Sixteen years later, in Johnson v. United States,34 we find Justice Thomas not
just disputing the supposed vagueness of a single statute, but casting doubt on
the entire vagueness doctrine." This time, his turn to history took him all the
way back to sixteenth-century England. Through four centuries, English and
American courts dealt with vague statutes 36 by applying a rule of strict con-
struction similar to today's rule of lenity." They did not reach out to nullify
whole provisions as unconstitutional. Indeed, the so-called "vagueness doc-
trine" -which involves striking down, rather than narrowly construing, a pro-
vision of law-did not make its first appearance in the Supreme Court until
1914." Justice Thomas noted that the doctrine "shares an uncomfortably simi-
lar history with substantive due process, a judicially created doctrine lacking
any basis in the Constitution.""
The vagueness doctrine represents another instance in which Justice
Thomas takes a very different approach than Justice Scalia.40 justice Scalia
wrote the majority opinion inJohnson, which struck down the so-called residu-
al clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) on vagueness grounds.4 1
32. Id. at 102-04.
33. Id. at 112 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (White, J., dissenting)).
34. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
35. Id. at 2563-64 (Thomas, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 2567 ("The problem of vague penal statutes is nothing new. The notion that such laws
may be void under the Constitution's Due Process Clauses, however, is a more recent devel-
opment.").
37. Id. ("Before the end of the 1 9 th century, courts addressed vagueness through a rule of strict
construction of penal statutes, not a rule of constitutional law.").
38. See id. at 2570 (discussing International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216
(1914), and Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914)).
39. Id. at 2564. More generally, Thomas was concerned that the Court had used the vagueness
doctrine to strike down an array of duly enacted statutes, including that at issue in Morales,
the policies of which Court majorities disapproved. Id. at 2566-67, 2571-72.
40. See generally William H. Pryor, Jr., justice Thomas, Criminal justice, and Originalisms Legiti-
macy, 127 YALE L.J. F. 173 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-thomas
-criminal-justice-and-originalisms-legitimacy [http://perma.cc/S3C6-6LQL].
41. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The ACCA provides for a higher prison term for defendants with three
prior convictions for, inter alia, a "violent felony." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1) (2012). The statuto-
ry definition of "violent felony" specifically mentions burglary, arson, extortion, and the use
of explosives, and then provides that any crime that "otherwise involves conduct that pre-
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Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment on other grounds,4 2 thereby leaving
"for ... another day" whether the entire vagueness doctrine is unfounded in
the Constitution.43
The path of least resistance is all too easy to take. In the law, that often
translates into a reflexive reliance on precedent. Justice Thomas is not so
tempted. In each and every opinion, he forces us to engage with the principle
and history that lie beyond past decisions -whether or not he once agreed with
their conclusions.44 That commitment to intellectual honesty is no doubt one
of his most profound and enduring contributions to the law.
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sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" is also included.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The just-quoted provision has become known as the ACCA's "residual
clause," which the Court inJohnson struck down as impermissibly vague under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the 14 th Amendment. 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
42. Thomas judged one of the defendant's previous convictions, possession of a sawed-off shot-
gun, not to come within the statutory definition of a "violent felony." 135 S. Ct. at 2563-66
(Thomas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 2566.
44. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520-21 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (ac-
knowledging that a precedent he joined was incorrectly decided).
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